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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Recent Decisions
PARENT AND CHILD - RIGHT OF RECOVERY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY BY CHILD AGAINST PARENT
The recent case of Signs v. Signs' marked a further step in the trend
away from the general rule that an unemancipated minor child cannot main-
tain a suit for personal injuries against his parent. Although that rule had
been followed in Ohio courts of appeals, 2 the Signs case presented to the
Ohio Supreme Court for the first time the question of its application. The
court held that the unemancipated minor son of a partner in a trucking
concern could recover damages from his father and the other partner for
personal injuries arising from their negligent maintenance of a defective
gasoline pump.3
It should be noted that the court's allowance of recovery was not founded
upon the father's membership in a partnership of which other members
would also be liable. It appears that no different result would be reached if
the father were being sued for injuries arising out of the father's operation
of a business by himself.
While before 1891 there seems to have been no case in England or
America to the effect that a parent is not civilly liable for a personal tort
to his minor child, the rule seems to have existed upon tradition and usage
of society.4 The first judicial pronouncement of the rule of parental im-
munity came in 1891 in the American case of Hewlett v. George.5 The
court held that a minor child could not bring an action against her mother
for damages arising from the mother's wrongful confinement of the child
in an insane asylum. The court, citing no authority, based its decision upon
the ground that such an action disturbs the peace and harmony of the family
and is thus contrary to public policy.
Largely because of the increased use of the automobile after 1891, many
personal injury actions between an unemancipated child and his parent
have come before the courts. Most of these cases were decided in accord
with the result of the Hewlett case.6 Various reasons have been advanced
1156 Ohio St 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
2Krohngold v. Krohngold, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 631, 181 N.E. 910 (1932); Canen v.
Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E. 277 (1931).
'Contra, Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W 1 (1932).
4For an excellent discussion of the origins, development and reasons supporting the
rule of parental immunity, see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Rela-
tion, 43 HARv. L REv. 1030, 1056 (1930)
See also COOLEY, TORTS 171 (1879); EVERSLEY, DOMESTic RELATIONS 601
(1885); REEVE, DOMESTiC RELATIONS 420 (3rd ed. 1862).
'68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
'Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark.
832, 114 S.W 2d 468 (1938); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At.
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by the courts for taling this position. They include protection of domestic
tranquility,7 prevention of depletion of the parenes funds to the detriment
of other children,8 adequate protection of the child through the criminal
laws,9 and a rule of the common law forbidding such actions10
Although the rule precluding actions for personal injuries between
parent and child has been widely followed, a growing number of courts
have refused to follow the majority view."
Modification of the general rule in a few recent cases has been based
upon the state of the parent's mind at the time he committed a personal
753 (1929); Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass 480, 13 N.E. 2d 438 (1938); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W 88(1926); Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W 1 (1932) (partnership
held not liable); Mannion v. Mannion, 3 N. J. Misc. 68, 129 At. 431 (1925); Can-
non v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N.E. 2d 236 (1942); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino,
248 N. Y. 626, 162 N.E. 551 (1928); Ciam v. Ciam, 127 Misc. Rep. 304, 215
N. Y. Supp. 767 (1926); Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923);
Krohngold v. Krohngold, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 631, 181 N.E. 910 (1932); Canen v.
Kraft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E. 227 (1931); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I.
131, 131 At. 198 (1925); Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W 2d 751
(1936); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W 664 (1903); Roller v.
Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905) (recovery denied in extreme case of
rape); Securo v. Securo, 110 W Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Segall v. Ohio Casu-
alty Co., 224 Wis. 379, 272 N. W 665 (1937); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212
N.W 787 (1927). See Zutter v. OConnell, 200 Wis. 601, 607, 229 N.W 73, 76(1930) (general rule precluded right of contribution from father who was con-
currently negligent).
'Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753 (1929); Luster v. Luster, 299
Mass. 480, 13 N.E. 2d 438 (1938); Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885(1891); Manion v. Manion, 3 N. J. Misc. 68, 129 Ad. 431 (1925); Small v. Mor-
rison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
The allowance of actions between parent and child for torts relating to property
by the same courts which disallow personal tort actions for reasons of domestic tran-
quility seems illogical since the possibility of bitter family dispute is no more remote
in suits based on property rights than in those cases on personal rights.
. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
'Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Ad. 753 (1929); Hewlett v. George,
68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo.App. 994, 124 S.W 2d
675 (1939); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W 664 (1903); Wick
v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W 787 (1927). OMO GEN. COD §§ 1639-46,
12970 provide criminal penalties for parental mistreatment of a child. Most other
states have similar statutory provisions.
"Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Elias v. Collins, 237
Mich. 175, 211 N.W 88 (1926); Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W
1 (1932); Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N. J. Misc. 849, 143 Ad. 3 (1928); McKelvey
v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242,
79 Pac. 788 (1905).
' It should be noted that the rule has not been applied to suits involving other family
relationships. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N.E. 2d 254 (1939) (brother
and sister); Spaulding v. Mineah, 264 N. Y. 589, 191 N.E. 578 (1934) (grand-
parent and grandchild); Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581,
281 N. W 671 (1938) (brother and sister).
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tort upon his child. Although this ground had been commented upon in
dicta,12 it was not until 1950 that a court, in Cowgill v. Boock,'5 held that
recovery would be allowed where the parent was guilty of wilful miscon-
duct, not merely negligence. A similar view was expressed in Mahnke v.
Moore,14 where it was held that a minor daughter could sue her father's
estate for psychic shock since justice demands that a parent be liable for
injuries to his child resulting from cruel and inhuman treatment.
Departures from the majority rule have been made most frequently
when the parent carried liability insurance. Recogmzing the insurer as the
party really interested in the parent's defense, and considering that when
the parent is insured there can be no basis for the public policy argument
against the suit, some courts have refused to apply the immumty rule.15 But
to other courts the presence of liability insurance has made no difference.
These courts assert that the existence of liability insurance does not create
a cause of action where none exists otherwise.'"
There are cases which depart from the majority rule on grounds other
than those already mentioned. In one case, the fact that the plaintiff was
an adopted son was determinative in the allowance of a suit for pain and
suffering by a minor child against his father.' In another,'8 the court said
'See Bullock v. Bullock, 45 Ga. App. 1, 8, 163 S.E. 708, 711 (1932); Cannon v.
Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 429, 40 N.E. 2d 236, 238 (1942); Securo v. Securo, 110
W Va. 1, 2, 156 S.E. 750, 751 (1931).
"189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950)
1477 A. 2d 923 (Md. 1951)
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
See Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 138 Misc. Rep. 485, 246 N. Y. Supp. 565 (1930).
" Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark.
832, 114 S.W 2d 468 (1938); Bullock v. Bullock, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708
(1932); Securo v. Securo, 110 WVa. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931).
' Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W 2d 245 (1939). The court took the
position that the statutes prescribing the rights and duties of adopted children and
adopting parents make no attempt to invest either the child or the parent with the
natural affections that exist between blood relations; therefore the reason for the rule
that prevents natural children from suing natural parents does not exist between
adopted children and adopting parents.
"Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. 2d 461 (1939)
"Contra: Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N. J. Misc. 849, 143 Ad. 3 (1928) (Action under
wrongful death statute for wrongful death of children due to negligence of parent).
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343 (1939).
' Some courts have held that the rule of parental immunity does not cancel an em-
ployer s liability on the principle of respondent supertor when the personal injury
was inflicted by the parent acting as a servant. Chase v. New Haven Waste Material
Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 At. 107 (1930); Foy v. Foy Electric Co., 231 N.C. 161,
56 S.E. 2d 418 (1949); Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E. 2d 540 (1948)
" 158 Ohio St. 107, 107 N.E.2d 337 (1952) discussed p. 83 infra.
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